Expansion of Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in China in the Perspective of International Management

1.0 Introduction

JLR is an UK-based multinational company engaging in automotive industry with two famous brands: Land Rover and Jaguar. The company had two major manufacturing plants in the UK before its international expansion. After it was acquired by Tata Group, JLR started aggressive internationalisation and its most important expansion is China. In 2012, it claimed a joint venture with Chinese partner, Chery to build manufacturing facilities in China. Chery is a SOE engaging in automobile industry in Changshu. The new manufacturing facilities started to manufacture automobiles in 2014 beginning with the model known as Evoque (Joseph, 2014). In 2014, JLR built a $1.8-billion joint venture with Chery which was the sixth largest Chinese automobile manufacturer. They built a 4.3-million square feet plant with the capacity of 130,000 units especially for the Chinese market. The joint venture was developed in accordance with the Chinese automobile industry’s regulation that a foreign company must adopt joint venture with a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) and hold fewer than 50% of stake in order to expand into China.

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the Chinese expansion of JLR in term of entry mode, internationalisation strategy, entry barriers, cultural issues and legal issues in order to make recommendations for the company. The research has the following objectives:

1) To build a literature review about internationalisation

2) To collect secondary data to analyse the case of JLR’s Chinese expansion

3) To discuss the findings of the secondary data with the literature review to generate conclusions and predict the prospect of JLR

JLR’s Chinese expansion was successful but its performance has been dropping in 2018 partly due to the joint venture that helped the success in the first place. The joint venture was effective that helped JLR avoid political risks, develop high level of localisation, and take advantage of Chery’s business network and government connections to contribute to its efficiency. The joint venture strategically fits in JLR’s objectives and vision of exploiting Asian market and optimising product localisation. Nevertheless, the joint venture aroused quality control issues as JRL had management right to directly control quality. The quality issues of JLR has been weakening its own brand image and competitive advantages. JLR had accumulated sufficient experience and capabilities for its internationalisation before it entered China. Its major internationalisation processes strictly comply with Uppsala model’s four phrases: not regular exporting, exporting via agent, subsidiary for manufacturing in overseas and wholly owned subsidiary for manufacturing in overseas. Building wholly owned plants in Brazil and Slovak Republic is consistent with OLI model.

This research has the following structure: 1) critically reviewing literature related with motives of internationalisation, cross culture issues, localisation, Uppsala model, entry models (exporting, joint venture and FDI) and entry barriers; 2) discussing the internationalisation process of JLR; and 3) focusing on JLR’s expansion in China.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Motives of Internationalisation

Dunning (2000) categorises the following motives of internationalisation including market seeking, resource seeking, strategic resource seeking, network seeking and efficiency seeking.

To begin with market seeking, a company recognises that it has core competencies to gain competitive advantage in a foreign market and increase its sales performance and profits thus engaging internationalisation (Dunning, 1993). Such companies normally operate in developed countries where have intensive competition and sophisticated customers (Dunning, 2000). By expanding to a developing country, they can use its core competencies to gain sustaining competitive advantages (Francis and Collins-Dodd, 2000). Also, these companies are motivated by the need to access their end customers in foreign markets (Francis and Collins-Dodd, 2000). They identify strong demands for their products and services in these markets. By directly engaging in these markets, they can maximise their profits (Dunning, 2000). Furthermore, companies also can be pushed by a declining and saturated domestic market where has intensive competition and sophisticated customers (Dunning, 2000). Because these companies are unable to continuously grow its revenue and profits in their domestic markets, they are pushed to international markets. Moreover, competitors’ internationalisation also motives these companies to engage in foreign markets (Francis and Collins-Dodd, 2000). Their competitors can collect huge amount of profits in a foreign market and then grow their core competencies thus threating to these companies’ competitive advantage and market positions. Therefore, competitors’ aggressive international expansion is a strong motive.

In terms of resource seeking motive, companies are attracted by abundant resources in overseas. In some developing countries, there are low cost and skilled labours, sufficient natural resources and weak law enforcement of labour and environment protection, which help as MNCs to largely reduce its costs and thus improve its competitive advantage. These resources are consistent with OLI model’s locational advantages that encourage MNCs to use Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Furthermore, pollution haven assumption points out that MNCs have the objective of minimising labour and environmental costs when they plan to develop overseas manufacturing facilities (Hollenstein, 2005). They build labour intensive and high pollutive factories in developing countries to reduce costs.

For strategic resource seeking motives, MNCs are attracted by critical resources such as innovation infrastructure, talents, experts and strong related industries in overseas to improve its core competencies and innovation performance (Dunning, 2000).

Network seeking motive is to build a network in a region by an expansion to improve operation within the whole region (Dunning, 2000). By engaging a foreign country, MNCs aim to build a hub and networks for a whole region. By this hub, these MNCs can exploit nearby countries. Also, developing network allows them to absorb market knowledge and improve culture competencies, which is consistent with the network in Uppsala model (Discussed in section 2.3).

Additionally, another motive of MNCs is to optimise their efficiency. Efficiency seekers expect to reduce logistics distance and tariffs by international expansion (Kubickova et al., 2014). By engaging in a foreign market, MNCs can reduce logistic distance to the market and nearby countries thus optimising their supply chain. Furthermore, through manufacturing in a host country, they can avoid high tariffs so as to reduce costs and improve profitability (Kubickova et al., 2014).

2.2 Cross Culture Issues and Standardisation/Localisation

Cross culture issue is one of the major challenges to international expansion. Culture can be explained as collective thinking of members in a society (Hutzschenreuter et al, 2011). It is related with beliefs, opinion, attitude and perception (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, culture differences can lead to conflicts in beliefs, opinion and attitude. Customers from different culture tend to have different preferences, tastes, value and perceptions (Darley et al, 2013). Therefore, standardised marketing strategy of a company tends to be less effective in those markets with large culture difference with the company’s home market.

Culture difference strongly affects the performance of MNCs’ international expansion (Darley et al, 2013). A longer culture distance has more negative impacts on the international expansion (Kaur and Chawla, 2016). Culture distance also causes difficulties to international joint venture and partnership, including differences in work style, organisational culture and climate, manager-employee relationship, leadership / management style, and communication style (Ekerete, 2001). These differences can arouse conflicts between foreign employees and expatriates. Also, culture distance negatively affects international negotiation between partners and partner relationship (Beguelsdijk et al., 2017).

Moreover, culture distance builds strong barriers to internationalisation by arousing misunderstanding and conflicts and reducing the effectiveness of marketing efforts. Culture distance strongly affects marketing activities and strategies including marketing mix, branding, and customer relationship. Cross culture marketing faces the difficulties in overcoming differences in language, communication style, and ethical standards (Peprah et al., 2017). Furthermore, customers in foreign culture tend to have different demands, lifestyle and behaviour (Peprah et al., 2017). Cultural distance has strong impacts on customer’s needs and wants, which is a strong entry barrier (Albaum & Tse, 2001). To expand those companies with longer cultural distance, MNCs tend to adopt adaptation approach. This approach enables them to have strong local responsiveness to local needs and demands (Albaum & Tse, 2001). Therefore, it is significant for MNCs to learn culture knowledge and improve their culture capabilities before their expansion.

MNCs are less able to adopt standardisation strategy to penetrate a foreign country which has a long culture distance with its home market (Gerhart, 2008). Localisation strategy tends to be more effective and efficient that allows MNCs to have strong local responsiveness (Rugman & Hodgetts, 2001). By localisation strategy, they can use localised products, services, promotion and distribution that fit in local customers’ demands and wants thus contributing to customer satisfaction and competitive advantages (Rugman & Hodgetts, 2001). Moreover, MNCs can identify local competitors’ strategy and activities and fast make response against competition, which facilitate their competitiveness and performance (Gerhart, 2008). Localisation can positively affect customer satisfaction, loyalty and relationship, competitive advantage and performance in a foreign market, whereas it also may threat the consistency of a global brand, increases costs and hinders MNCs to economies of scale (Ang & Massingham, 2007).

2.3 Uppsala Learning Model for Internationalisation Process

Due to the strong and far-reaching influences of culture distance, it is necessary and significant for MNCs to study culture and increase culture competencies to have a success international expansion (Ang & Massingham, 2007).

Besides culture distance, Uppsala model consider many differences in the path of MNCs’ internationalisation, including language, business practices, education, industrialisation level and political systems (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977)

Uppsala learning model suggests a learning curve for MNCs’ internationalisation process. It views the process as the learning curve that MNCs gradually increase their internationalisation competencies and market knowledge for a foreign market and then arise their commitment and involvement in the market (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Also, the learning curve suggests that MNCs expand to a country which has a closer culture and geographic distance with their home market and then gradually move to those countries with a longer culture and geographic distance with the home market (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). MNCs can learn culture knowledge and develop culture competencies during the process.

In the 1977’s Uppsala model (Figure 1), MNCs make decides on their commitment and involvement in a foreign market based on their market knowledge and the commitment affects their capability to absorb and learn market knowledge which in return affects the commitment decisions (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). In other words, MNCs gradually increase their commitment in a foreign market along with the increase in their market knowledge.

This process can be categorised into four steps including 1) non-regular export; 2) export via agency; 3) subsidiary for sales and distribution in a host country; and 4) manufacturing in a host country (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).

Figure 1: Uppsala Model in 1977

(Source from: Johanson & Vahlne, 1977)

Due to changes in market environment and rising globalisation, Johanson & Vahlne (2009) developed a new model (Figure 2) that focuses on networks and partnership. The new model advocates that networks and relationship are helpful for MNCs to address cross culture issues and overcome psychic distance. By developing relationship with local partners, MNCs can absorb market knowledge from them thus improving their localisation strategy and competitive advantage (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Therefore, a MNC’s commitment to develop relationship with local partners affect what it can learn from partners and which much trust they have. These have impacts on the MNC’s network, which in return is related with the opportunity of the MNC to acquire market knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). Generally, this model suggests MNCs to develop network and a trustful partnership with local companies to overcome psychic distance.

Figure 2: Uppsala Internationalisation Model

(Source: Johanson and Vahlne, 2009)

2.4 Entry Strategy and Entry Model

Entry mode is strongly associated with entry strategy and it has to be supportive to entry strategy. Cunningham (1986) concludes five major strategies including 1) technology innovation; 2) product localisations; 3) risk aversion; 4) pricing penetration; and 5) fully localisation. Two entry modes are related with JLR’s internationalisation process.

2.4.1 Exporting

Exporting is the start point of an internationalisation in Uppsala model and requires low level of market knowledge and commitment. By indirect exports, a company’s products are sold through export intermediaries who control over distribution and sales in a foreign country while the company has no control over its products in the country. Indirect exports have both advantages and disadvantages (Durmaz & Tasdemir, 2014). Firstly, it allows a company to fast access a foreign market, largely avoid risks, and avert any investment and export management (Durmaz & Tasdemir, 2014). More importantly, indirect exporting helps the company to collect market knowledge in Uppsala model. However, its disadvantages are prominent. The exporter cannot control over distribution, sales and marketing, so the intermediates may negatively affect its brand equity in the country (Bartett, 2009). Also, the intermediates may not effectively deliver market feedback and knowledge.

Direct exporting can be realised by sales representatives, importing distributors and own subsidiary of an MNC. It allows MNCs to control over their sales, distribution and marketing activities in a foreign market. Also, it offers information feedback from target market and cultivates greater customer relationships (Cullen et al., 2011). MNCs can well protect their know-how and Intellectual Properties (IP)s including patents, trademarks and goodwill. Potentially, it can generate more revenue and profits than indirect exporting. Nevertheless, direct exporting requires higher costs including time, resources and personnel as well as higher risks than indirect exporting (Durmaz & Tasdemir, 2014).

2.4.2 Joint Venture

Joint venture is an effective entry mode that allows companies to fast expand into a foreign country (Luo, 2007). It helps a MNCs to accomplish five objectives: 1) entry a foreign market; 2) risk-sharing; 3) knowledge and technology sharing; 4) facilitating implementation of localisation; and 5) compliance to government regulations (Mujtaba & Martina, 2011). By joint venture with a local company especially SOE, an MNC can build its political connections and a good government relationship to relieve political risks especially in developing countries (Geringer, 1991). Joint venture with a SOE is an effective approach to address political uncertainties and overmuch government interferences in developing countries (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Furthermore, local partners offer market knowledge and network which are conductive to MNCs’ expansion.

Joint venture is effective if all parties have converged strategic goals, partners have large market size, market power and resources close to the industry leaders, and all parties can acquire knowledge from each other (Harrigan, 1988). The core issues of a joint venture include ownership control, pricing, knowledge transferring, local partners’ resources and capabilities and government interferences (Geringer & Hebert, 1989).

However, joint venture also can be problematic especially for Chinese companies: 1) conflicts about inputs of local partners and MNCs; 2) performance management and profit sharing; and 3) cross-culture issues (Donglin & Fang, 2007). Moreover, the changes in strategic goal of MNCs and their partners can compromise the performance of their joint venture. Moreover, the IPs and knowhow are important issues in a joint venture. Local partners tend may steal IPs, expertise and knowhow of MNCs who potentially raise low competitors (Donglin & Fang, 2007). These issues are prevalent in those countries where have a weak IP protection such as China.

2.4.3 FDI

An FDI can be accomplished by greenfield investment or acquisition. Greenfield investment is widely used to build the wholly owned subsidiary which can be fully controlled by an MNC. It is effective to build a manufacturing plant requiring high professional skills and knowhow (Luu, 2016). The MNC can rigorously control over quality and Just-In-Time (JIT) manufacturing, which are critical for competitive advantages and global brand image (Luu, 2016). Greenfield investment is highly risk because it requires larger investment, whereas it well protects the MNC’s Intellectual Properties (IPs), knowhow and expertise. On the other hand, joint venture partners could steal these resources.

2.5 OLI Model

Dunning (1979) developed OLI model that helps an MNC to decide on entry model by evaluating three types of advantages: 1) ownership advantages; 2) location advantages; and 3) internalisation advantages. Those companies with all three types of advantages tend to involve in FDI, whereas joint venture is more suitable for those without internalisation advantages. Ownership advantages refer to advantages that an MNC can obtain in a foreign market (Dunning, 2000). Location advantages mean the advantages that the MNC can gain from a foreign country and these advantages normally include natural resources, human resources and infrastructure that can contribute to the MNC’s value-adding activities (Dunning, 2000). Internalisation advantages refers to the advantages that the MNC can gain by operating its all businesses itself rather than working with partners (Twomey, 2000).

2.6 Entry Barriers

Besides cross-cultural issues, another prominent entry barrier is political uncertainties especially in developing countries. Political uncertainties can strongly affect a MNC’s foreign expansion (Luo et al., 2017). However, in developing countries especially in China, government inferences are frequency and strong (Luo et al., 2017). With a Confucianism culture, paternalism is prevalent and strong in China. In the one-party ruled regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can directly determine policies, law and law enforcements. With a low level of democracy, political uncertainties can be great threats to MNCs. More importantly, the CCP controls all mainstream media thus shaping public opinions. With high level of paternalism, it tends to affect public opinions to brands and products. Thus, government relation is critical for all businesses in China (Liou and Wu, 201). Furthermore, Chinese government tends to release ambiguous policies and regulations for its strategic purposes (Luo et al., 2017). However, these ambiguities are challenging for MNCs to understand and creating uncertainties to their businesses. Moreover, Intellectual Properties (IPs) are weak in China that can be a serious challenge for MNCs to protect their brand equity, knowhow, expertise and patents in the country (Li & Alon, 2020). Furthermore, Chinese government strategically uses its weak IP protection to encourage local companies and SOEs to absorb knowledge from MNCs (Schotter & Teagarden, 2014).

3.0 Internationalisation Process of JLR

3.1 History of JLR Oversea Investment

JLR has a long history of internationalisation. It was founded in 2008 while Jaguar and Land Rover have own history respectively. Jaguar was founded in 1933 and experienced many major changes in its ownership (Salam, 2013). It merged with the British Motor Corporation in 1965, became independent in 1984, and acquired by Ford in 1999. In 2008, Ford sold Jaguar and Land Rover to Tata Motors (an Indian Group). In 2013, Jaguar and Land Rover were merged to one subsidiary which was wholly owned by Tata Group. On the other hand, Rover had been a product line of British Leyland Motor Corporation until it was acquired by BMW in 1994. It was sold to Ford in 2000 and then to Tata Motor in 2008. This means that JLR worked with German, American and Indian companies respectively. Their history helps them to have good culture capabilities and knowledge. Furthermore, with the support of BMW and Ford, Jaguar and Land Rover were sold throughout Europe and the US, which offered them a certain level of internationalisation knowledge and market knowledge.

After JLR became a subsidy of Tata Group, its major internationalisation processes include the following steps: 1) worked with contract Indian manufacturer in 2011; 2) built the joint venture to manufacture in China in 2014; 3) built its first wholly owned oversea manufacturing plant in Brazil in 2015; 4) completed building another wholly owned manufacturing plant in Slovakia Republic in 2016; and 5) worked with contract manufacturer – Magna Steyr in Austria in 2017 (Jaguar and Land Rover, 2015 and Jancarikova, 2018).

However, JLR acquired market knowledge and network for Asia from Tata Group which is an India-based conglomerate holding many international businesses. The Group is highly diversified and engages multiple sectors including automotive, Airlines, Chemicals, defence, finance, home appliances, IT services, retailing, e-commerce, real estate, steel, telecommunication, hospitality and electrics (Tata, 2019). Therefore, the Group has strong, various and wide business networks and market knowledge around the world especially in Asia. Its resources and network strongly helped JLR’s internationalisation.

In 2011, JLR started its internationalisation in India by build a contract partnership with Indian supplier who offer components for JLR in the country (Salam, 2013). Even though India is the home market of Tata Group, this partnership still developed JLR’s cultural and internationalisation capabilities. This plant cultivated JLR’s human resources for internationalisation.

With the help of Tata Group, JLR was able to access China which shares border with India and has relatively short culture distance. Since 2010, JLP has been penetrating into China by exporting via agents and then exporting via own subsidiary. In 2014, the company made a joint venture with Chinese Chery Automobile which has been a SOE.

In 2015, JLR built it first wholly owned oversea manufacturing facility in Brazil, which is consistent with Uppsala model: with the growing internationalisation experience and capability, JLR was unable to increase its commitment in overseas. Also, JLR had been operating in the country for 25 years and Brazil had been one of its important markets before the establishment of the wholly owned subsidiary (Jaguar and Land Rover, 2016). This means that JLR had sound and efficient market knowledge and business network in the country, which also is supported by Uppsala model.

In 2016, JLR expanded into Slovak Republic, a central European country, which was motivated by government incentives, low labour costs and skilled labour and the growing demand from China. The company built its manufacturing facilities by FDI.

In 2018, JLR adopted outsource to involve into Austria. It outsourced the production of its two products (E-Pace and I-Pace) to the Magna Steyr which has been manufacturing some Mercedes Benz’s products, BMW Mini and some products of Peugeot (Jancarikova, 2018). JLR planned to work with the Magna Steyr in long term. This outsource was motivated by JLR’s own insufficient capacity. Its own British manufacturing factories were close to full capacity (Campbell, 2017). To meet the rising demands for electrical vehicle, JLR had to outsource the two electronical products. More importantly, this outsource is consistent with Dunning (2000)’s argument that MNCs seek strategic resources. The Magna Steyr company had capabilities and resources to manufacture electrical vehicles. These capabilities and resources were rare in 2018. By working with Magna Steyr, JLR can offer customers electrical products which meet customers’ new demands and contribute to its competitive advantages.

3.2 Oversea Affiliates

The whole internationalisation process of JLR strictly complies with Uppsala model’s four phrases: not regular exporting, exporting via agent, subsidiary for manufacturing in overseas and wholly owned subsidiary for manufacturing in overseas.

3.1 Exporting

Jaguar adopted exporting to penetrate the Brazilian market in 1991 (Jaguar and Rover, 2016). After the good response of non-regular exporting, the company built wholly own subsidiary for distribution and marketing. Even though Jaguar faced a long geographical distance and huge economic differences in Brazil. The country has colonial tier and was a colony of Portugal, where has remaining European culture. More important, Brazil is geographical close to the US, so Ford helped JLR largely exploit the market in the early 2000s. Before JLR’s factory project, Brazil was one of its top 15 markets.

JLR’s expansion in China started with non-regular exporting when Chinese smugglers shipped its products to mainland China in 1990s and the early 2000s. JLR recognised that its products were welcomed in China (Salam, 2013). In 2004, Ford started to use Chinese intermediates to sell Jaguar and Land Rover in China (Salam, 2013), which could be viewed as exporting via agent in Uppsala. After 6 years’ exporting, JLR viewed that Chinese market had great potential and Chinese consumers had preference to British cars.

In 2010, JLR built its wholly own subsidiary to control over its sales, marketing and distribution in China under the support of Tata Group. This subsidiary allowed JLR to implement direct exporting that improved distribution, marketing and sales in the country. Its expansion in China started with Shanghai which has a colonial tier with the UK (Dandan, 2018). Then, it expanded into Guangzhou, Beijing and other tier one cities. These cities had not only stronger consumption capabilities but also greater openness and preference to exported products. By 2015, the company built its 4S stores in most of tier one and two cities and completed its distribution. The success of this expansion was strongly related with Tata Group’s business network and market knowledge. This is supported by Uppsala model’s network and market knowledge.

3.2 wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS)

3.2.1 Brazil

After its joint venture with Chery, JLR acquired experience of international joint venture and developed relevant capabilities. In accordance with Uppsala model, it moved to Brazil which has been culturally and geographically far from the UK and India. However, JRL had accumulated sufficient experience and market knowledge by its subsidiary. In 2015, the company has 35 dealers throughout main regions of the country. According to Jaguar and Land Rover (2015), the company worked with local companies closely in human resource development and invested in training program for skilled workers. More importantly, JLR was market leader for midsize high-end SUV before the greenfield investment (Jaguar and Land Rover, 2015). In accordance with Uppsala model, the company had strong networks, many local partners and long operating experience (over 25 years) that supported the greenfield investment.

This expansion can be explained by marketing-seeking, resource-seeking, network-seeking and efficiency-seeking in Dunning (2000)’s argument. Brazil was a strong emerging market and South Africa was less exploited market. JLR identified its opportunities in there given that it had competitive advantages in the country. Thus, the company was motivated by market opportunities. Also, there were low cost labour and skilled workers because automobile manufacturing industry was relatively advanced in the country. However, the country had weak law enforcement of environmental protection and labour protection. This is consistent with pollutive haven assumption allowing JLR to minimise the costs of labour and environment management. In terms of network and efficiency, the company can use its plant in Brazil to supply the US, Canada and South American market. The plant can work as a hub reaching these markets without shorter distance and efficient logistics.

Moreover, entry barriers to the country were low. Brazilian government was urgent to create job opportunities due to its economic recession. JLR gained government incentives for this expansion.

The greenfield investment accords with OLI model. The company had ownership advantages such as good sales performance, wide distribution networks, etc. Also, it has location advantages including low labour costs and skilled workers. Additionally, it had internalisation advantages because it had enough market knowledge. Also, by greenfield investment, it strongly controlled the quality of its products in its Brazilian plant and effectively transferred its knowledge without the risk of exposing its to partners. With ownership, location and internalisation advantages, it was suitable for JLR to employ greenfield investment.

3.2.2 Slovak Republic

Before its Brazilian plant was already for production, JLR expanded into Slovak Republic a Central European country by building another wholly owned manufacturing plant. This expansion can be explained by Dunning (2000)’s argument that MNCs’ internationalisation is motivated by seeking resources, efficiency and network.

The plant was developed to manufacture Land Rover Discovery SUV with an initial capacity of 150,000 cars and JLR invested US$ 1.6 billion for this plant (Jancarikova, 2018). After Brexit, the plant played more importantly strategic role by manufacturing second model.

To begin with resource-seeking, JLR demanded low labour costs and skilled labour. The country’s monthly minimum wage was only 380 euro in 2015 (Eurostat, 2020). However, the country had a large number of skilled workers engaging in automobile manufacturing industry. According to Oica (2018), 129,000 workers were employed by Volkswagen, PSA, KIA and tier one suppliers in global manufacturing industry and 250,000 workers were related with automobile industry. This means that JLR can hire skilled labour with lower labour costs. Ismaili et al. (2016) agree that workforce in the country is highly skilled, productive and flexible. The country has well-developed vocational education for engineers and mechanicals (Ismaili et al. 2016). Meanwhile, it can access abundant resources from automobile manufacturing. For example, the country’s steel production was about 425,000 Thousand Tonnes in 2015 (Trading Economics, 2019), which can supply automobile manufacturing. The automobile related industries were well developed in the country, given that automobile accounted for the country’s 40% of exports and 44% of total industrial production (Ismaili et al. 2016). In 2015, automobile production in the country reached 1 million units. These related industries can offer JLR resources for manufacturing.

Moreover, JLR’s expansion in Slovak Republic improved its efficiency and networks. There were many tier one and tier two suppliers of automobile who offer high quality products in the country. Over 300 suppliers in the country can offer parts and components for JLR (Ismaili et al. 2016). Therefore, JLR enjoys a short logistics distance to its many suppliers, which saves the difficulty and time consumption of inbound logistics and improves efficiency. With a shorter distance, JLR can manage its Just-In-Time (JIT) manufacturing in a more efficient way thus reducing costs and wastes. Meanwhile, the plant in the country is close to European markets of JLR including Turkey, Greece, Italy, the UK, etc. Especially, the demands for JLR were growing in the UK. It was urgent for the company to build a manufacturing plant in Europe to supply the UK market. JLR can have a short logistics distance to these countries by investing in Slovak Republic. After Brexit, the plant became more strategically important. The trade agreement between the EU and the UK is uncertain. This plant can manufacture products that still enjoy low tariff within the EU. Thirdly, JLR had the opportunity to enjoy strategic resources in the country because the innovation infrastructure was rising in there. With prosperous automobile industry, the government heavily invested in innovation facilities and research centres. Many large automobile manufacturers outsourced their R&D contracts to Slovakia. JLR can access advocated technologies and innovations by expanding into this country, which is consistent with Dunning (2000)’s argument about MNC’s motive of strategic resource seeking.

Furthermore, JLR was motivated by low entry barriers. Political environment can be a strong entry barrier (Luo et al., 2017), whereas the government supports FDI in automobile manufacturing industry (Ismaili et al. 2016). The government made contributions to the bidding process of JLR. It assembled a group who focused on JLR’s investment project and offered JLR financial incentives. The Prime Minister of the country personally negotiated with JLR. These evidences showed that the government had great concern to JLR’s investment. The government offered JLR a 130-million-euro aid and helped the company build facility and road. Furthermore, political stability of the country was high. JLR received less political risks in the country and low entry barrier.

3.2.3 Greenfield investment

JLR adopted greenfield investment to build its wholly owned manufacturing plants in Brazil and Slovakia Republic. In accordance with Luu (2016)’s argument, greenfield investment enabled JLR to strongly control over the two plants in terms of quality and Just-In-Time (JIT) manufacturing, thus ensuring its competitive advantages and global brand equity. Also, the two plants require high professional skills and knowhow, which are suitable for greenfield investment. The government supports and strong market demands reduced the risks of the two greenfield investments. Also, JLR avoided leakage for IPs and knowhow.

The two FDIs in Brazil and Slovakia Republic were consistent with OLI model. JLR had ownership advantages in the two countries including knowledge, knowhow and brand image. It also enjoyed location advantages including low labour costs, skilled labour and resources for automobile manufacturing. In Slovakia Republic, there were strategic resources for R&D. Additionally, JLR had internalisation advantages: the benefits of greenfield investment and its wide distribution networks in Brazil. With all the three types of advantages, it was suitable for JLR to adopt FDI in accordance with Dunning (2000)’s argument.

4.0 Case Study

In accordance with the four phrases in Uppsala model, JLR successfully achieved exporting and then started to build manufacturing facilities in overseas. Its first oversea automobile assembling plant was built in China by the joint venture with Chery. China has a shorter psychic distance with India including economy, culture, institutions and society. As the figure 3 shows, Chinese and Indian culture are mainly diverged in individualism and long-term orientation while they are converged in power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and indulgence. To be noticed, even though two culture has a 36-score gap in long-term orientation, Indian culture is not short-term oriented, but it is at the middle. Thus, the cultural conflicts in this dimension are not very large and prominent. The problems caused by this level of culture differences were manageable to JLR especially with the support of Tata Group. More importantly, JLR can absorb market knowledge from its Chery. Given that JLR had worked with Germens (BMW), Americans (Ford) and Indians (Tata), they tended to be able to work with Chinese. This joint venture brough JLR many advantages and strengthened its competitive advantages in China, which is specifically discussed in Section 4.0.

Figure 3: Hofstede national culture dimensions, China VS. India

(Source from: Hofstede-Insights, 2020)

4.1 Rationale, Activities and Value Chain

4.1.1 Rationale

In 2012, JLR announced its partnership with Chery, a Chinese state-owned manufacturer of automobile. The two companies formed a 50-to-50 joint venture that manufactures localised products in China. The first plant was built in 2014 and then other five plants were already to produce between 2015 and 2017 (Jian, 2019). There were many rationales for this expansion, which can be explained by Dunning (2000)’s argument about motives of internationalisation.

JLR can be viewed as a market seeker who found great market potential in China and had competitive advantage in there. In figure 4, the vehicle sales in China showed a generally growing trend between 2012 and 2017.

Figure 4: Total Vehicle Sales in China

(Source from: Trading Economies, 2020)

Meanwhile, it recognised that the UK market would incline in long-term and thus moved its strategic focus to Asia especially China. In 2013, China had become JLR’s single-largest market bypass its home market (the UK). Therefore, its indicated that Chinese market was more promising than the UK and the company had strong competitive advantage in there.

Figure 5: Sales of JRL by regions

(Source from: Statista, 2018a)

Also, the market share of JLR in China has been growing especially after the joint venture (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Market share of Chinese automobile industry between 2011 and 2017

(Statista, 2018b)

Secondly, JLR was motivated by labour and nature resources in China. In 2012, Chinese automobile industry was booming that trained a large number of skilled workers whereas the labour costs were still low (AMS, 2013). Meanwhile, law enforcement of environment protection and labour protection was weak. These factors accorded with pollution haven assumption that JLR minimised its costs of labour and environmental management.

Thirdly, JLR used the joint venture to improve its efficiency and networks. It was allowed to achieve high level of localisation because Chery as the country’s 6^th largest automobile manufacturer and a SOE had sufficient market knowledge, wide business networks and deep government connections including local governments. This allowed JRL to further expand its distribution networks, develop localised products and run localised marketing activities. Generally, the joint venture helped JLR to relieve political risks in China.

Furthermore, the joint venture was necessary because Chinese government did not allow FDI in automobile manufacturing industry. It permitted 50-to-50 joint ventures with a SOE and the SOE must have full management right. By this joint venture, JLR was allowed to bypass 25% tariff and thus gain price and cost advantages in the country. By reducing prices, the company increased its sales before 2019.

4.1.2 Activities

The joint venture was worthy of $1.8 billion and its initial capacity was 130, 000 vehicles per year (Luo et al., 2017). It does not supply international market but only manufactured localised products especially for China. To be specific, the plant manufactures Chery range rover Evoque, Chery land rover discovery sport, Chery Jaguar XFL, Chery Jaguar XEL and Chery Jaguar E-Pace. In 2019, JLR planned to introduce 30 new vehicles or revamped vehicles in Chine by 2020 to improve its local responsiveness and sales in the country (Auto news, 2019). These products were localised to meet Chinese demands and response local competition. Furthermore, JLR recognised that cost performance is a critical factor affecting Chinese consumer buying decisions in automobile industry. Thus, it uses the plant to minimise costs and reduces prices.

4.1.3 Position in Value Chain

The joint venture contributed both supporting and primary activities of JLR’s value chain in Porter’s theory. It saved inbound logistics, improved operations and marketing & sales with help of Chery in terms of primary activities. For support activities, Chery offered manufacturing labours, talents and specialists and it built plants and facilities. JLR has been only focusing on knowledge transferring which simplified its expansion tasks. Thus, this joint venture has strong contributions to JLR’s value chain in China.

4.2 Entry Mode and Entry Barriers

In order to avoid political risks in China, JLR adopted a joint venture as its entry mode. As a SOE, Chery’s many top managers are former government officials and it takes direct orders from State Asset Regulatory Commission (SARC) (Luo et al., 2017). Its corporate governance contains both a board and the CCP branch and the branch acts more important role (Guluzade, 2019). All SOEs deep and great connections with the government (Guluzade, 2019). By the joint venture, JLR can develop its government relations and effectively address ambiguous policies which are prevalent (Luo et al., 2017). Also, government relations are critical for all businesses in China (Liou and Wu, 2011). More importantly, with help of Chery, JLR can relieve the negative impacts of overmuch government inferences and paternalism (Luo et al., 2017).

This joint venture was compulsive according to Chinese government’s regulation (China Certification, 2017). This regulation was designed with the purpose of developing Chinese national automobile industry and encouraging Chinese own brands. The government did not allow WOS in automobile industry and it permitted 50-to-50 joint ventures with a SOE and the SOE must have full management right (Luo et al., 2017). Using joint venture complies with the government regulation, which is consistent with Mujtaba & Martina (2011)’s argument.

Furthermore, the joint venture allowed JLR to use the market knowledge from Chery and take advantage of Chery’s business network and government connections, which is supported by Uppsala model. It helped JLR to implement high level of localisation strategy, achieve great local responsiveness and thus increase in sales in China, which is supported by Rugman & Hodgetts (2001)’s argument and Mujtaba & Martina (2011)’s.

The joint venture assisted JLR to address the major entry barrier – political uncertainties. By partnership with Chery, JLR can develop great government relations to relieve political risks, address political uncertainties and overmuch government interferences in developing countries in accordance with the arguments of Geringer & Hebert (1989) and Geringer (1991). Chery can effectively interpret ambiguities in Chinese policies and regulations. Also, it has deep government connections that help the joint venture to effectively address government paperwork and bureaucratism.

Nevertheless, the joint venture also has problems. Even though Chery also is a multinational company and has great culture capabilities, the two parties still face divergences in opinions and communication style. Another problem is quality control. To pursue price advantage, JRL has been reducing quality of its Chinese products. Furthermore, it had no management right in this joint venture, so it cannot directly control quality. As a result, JLR made 13 recalls covering over 106,000 cars in 2017 alone (Jian, 2019). The inferior quality negatively affected its brand image in China, which is supported by Ang & Massingham (2007)’s argument. In Chinese consumers’ perspective, western brand represents high quality and performance. Whereas the quality issues of JLR has been weakening its own brand image and competitive advantages. As a result, the JLR’s revenue in China dropped significant in 2019. Between 2013 and 2019, JLR’s profit experienced a serious fluctuation from £1,674 million in 2013, skyrocketed to £2,614 million in 2015, and dropped £ 3,600 million in 2019 (Statista, 2020a). The strong fluctuation can be explained by the changes in sales in China. The sales of JLR in China also grew and then dropped significantly. According to Statista (2020b), the sales in China was 95,200 in 2013, grew to 146,400 in 2017 and then dropped to 99,370 in 2019.

More importantly, JLR faced high risk of IPs protection in China especially in automobile industry. In many lawsuits that Chinese SOEs violated foreign companies’ IPs, these SOEs won these lawsuits including Yema VS. Mustang, Porsche VS. Zotye, etc. (Wright, 2020). To be noticed, Zotye has several products which has very similar with Land Rover’s products. This issue is supported by Schotter & Teagarden (2014) who highlight that Chinese government strategically uses its weak IP protection to help SOEs and local companies.

JLR has to manage its own partner (Chery) to steal its IPs in accordance with Donglin & Fang (2007)’s argument that local partners tend may steal IPs, expertise and knowhow of MNCs who potentially raise low competitors. By addressing this issue, JLR only offered outdated models, low-end tasks and localised products to the joint venture in the beginning. For example, Chery Range Rover Evoque was a highly localised product different with Range Rover Evoque for international market. The joint venture took responsibilities of assembling tasks and had less involvement in top technologies of JLR. However, with the increase in its commitment in China, the joint venture started to manufacture high end products such as Chery Jaguar XFL and Chery Jaguar E-Pace. Even though the trustworthiness of the partner also is growing, the risk of losing IPs for JLR is rising.

4.3 Strategic Alignment

The joint venture strategically fits in JLR’s objectives and vision. The company had the strategy of improve localisation and operation efficiency. As discussed, its efficiency and localisation were enhanced. Also, it had the strategy of exploiting the rising Chinese market. The remarkable sales revenue before 2018 suggest that the joint venture helped the company accomplish its strategic goal.

5.0 Conclusions

The Chinese expansion of JLR was successful while its performance is dropping partly because the entry model helped the success in the first place. The joint venture was effective that helped JLR avoid political risks in China, develop government relations, effectively address ambiguous policies, use the market knowledge from Chery to develop high level of localisation, and take advantage of Chery’s business network and government connections to contribute to its efficiency. With the help of Chery, JRL developed localised products, increased its distribution, used localised marketing strategy and improve its efficiency of addressing government paperwork. The joint venture strategically fits in JLR’s objectives and vision of exploiting Asian market and optimising product localisation.

However, the joint venture brought quality control issues because JRL cannot directly control the management of these plants. The quality issues of JLR has been weakening its own brand image and competitive advantages. JLR faced high risk of IPs protection in China especially in automobile industry. There are copycats selling similar products, which however compromises JLR’s brand image. As a result, the JLR’s revenue in China dropped significant in 2019.

This research finds that JLR had sufficient experience and capabilities for its internationalisation before it entered China. With the help of Tata Group, the company has sufficient knowledge to operate in Asia. JLR’s major internationalisation processes include contract Indian manufacturer in 2011, the joint venture in China in 2014, its first wholly owned oversea manufacturing plant in Brazil in 2015, another wholly owned manufacturing plant in Slovakia Republic in 2016, and another contract partnership with Magna Steyr in Austria in 2017. Its internationalisation process strictly complies with Uppsala model’s four phrases: not regular exporting, exporting via agent, subsidiary for manufacturing in overseas and wholly owned subsidiary for manufacturing in overseas. Building wholly owned plants in Brazil and Slovak Republic is consistent with OLI model: JLR had ownership, location and internalisation advantages in there. Also, it was motivated by market seeking, resource seeking, network seeking and efficiency seeking.

For the prospect of JLR in China, the company has to further enhance its localisation to meet more Chinese consumers, which however could negatively affect its brand image in the mind of some Chinese consumers. If JLR targets at lower income groups, its brand image will certainly drop in the mind of Chinese upper class. This pushes itself to improve cost performance and reduce prices. Currently, the high level of localisation has made the company lose its British identity and compromise its brand image. In future, JLR has to identify an effective way to protect its brand image while improve localisation.

Reference

Albaum, G. and Tse, D. K. (2001) Adaptation of International Marketing Strategy Components, Competitive Advantage, and Firm Performance: A Study of Hong Kong Exporters, Journal of International Marketing 9(4):59-81

AMS (2013). China's carmakers balance demand and labour costs, Retrieved from: <https://www.automotivemanufacturingsolutions.com/chinas-carmakers-balance-demand-and-labour-costs/31621.article >

Antunes, I., Barandas-Karl, H., & Martins, F. V. (2013). The impact of national cultures on international marketing strategy and subsidiary performance of Portuguese SME’s. The International Journal of Management, 2(3), 38-45

Ang, Z.Y., and Massingham, P. (2007) National culture and the standardization versus adaptation of knowledge management. Journal of Knowledge Management, 11(2), 5-21.

Auto news (2019). Jaguar Land Rover readies product blitz, Available at: < https://www.autonews.com/china/jaguar-land-rover-readies-product-blitz>

Baack, D., Harris, E.G., and Baack, D. (2011). International Marketing. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Bartett, C.A. (2009), Transnational Management: Text, Cases and Readings in Cross-Border Management. 5th Ed., McGraw-Hill Higher Education

Beguelsdijk, S., Kostova, T., Kunst, V. E. et al. (2017) Cultural Distance and Firm Internationalization: A Meta-Analytical Review and Theoretical Implications, Journal of Management, 44(1), 89-130

Boermans, M. A. and Roselfsema, H. (2012) ‘A Resource-Based View of Internationalization in Emerging Economies’, Impacts of Emerging Economies and Firms on International Business, 13-31

Campbell, P. (2017). Jaguar Land Rover to build new SUV outside UK. Ft.com. Available at: .

Chen, T., Chen, H. and Ku, Y. (2004). Foreign direct investments and local linkages. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(4), pp. 320-333.

Cullen, K. Parboteeah, P. & John, B. (2011). Strategic international management (5th ed.). Australia: South-Western Cengage Learning.

Dandan, Z. (2018). Jaguar Land Rover targets big China expansion, Available at: < http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-09/01/content_36853916.htm>

Darley, W. K., Luethge, D. J., Blankson, C. (2013). Culture and international marketing: A sub-Saharan African context. Journal of Global Marketing, 26(4), 188-202

Dimitratos, P. and Plakoyiannaki, E. (2003). Theoretical Foundations of an International Entrepreneurial Culture. Journal of International Entrepreneurship, 1(2), pp. 187-215.

Durmaz, Y. & Tasdemir, A. (2014). A Theoretical Approach to the Methods Introduction to International Markets, International Journal of Business and Social Science, 5(6), 47 – 54.

Donglin, W. & Fang, Z. (2007). Entry Modes For International Markets: Case Study Of Huawei, A Chinese Technology Enterprise, International Review of Business Research Papers, 3(1), pp.183 – 196

Dunning, J. H. (1993). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Addison Wesley Publishing Company.

Dunning, J. (1979). "Toward an Eclectic Theory of International Production: Some Empirical Tests". Journal of International Business Studies. 11 (1): 9–31.

Dunning, J. H. (2000). "The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories of MNE activity". International Business Review. 9 (2): 163–190

Ekerete, P. P. (2001). The effect of culture on marketing strategies of multinational firms: A survey of selected multi-national corporations in Nigeria. African Study Monographs, 22(2), 93-101

Eurostat (2020). Minimum Wage of Slovak Republic, Retrieved from: < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/EARN_MW_CUR>

Francis, J. and Collins-Dodd, C. (2000). The Impact of Firms' Export Orientation on the Export Performance of High-Tech Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Journal of International Marketing, 8(3), pp. 84-103.

Gerhart, B. (2008) Cross Cultural Management Research: Assumptions, Evidence, and Suggested Directions. International Journal of Cross-Cultural management, 8(3), 259-274.

Geringer J. M. (1991). Strategic Determinants of Partner Selection Criteria in International Joint Ventures, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1st Qtr., 1991), pp. 41-62

Geringer J. M., & Hebert L. (1989). Control and Performance of International Joint Ventures, Journal of International Business Studies, 20(2), pp. 235-254

Guluzade, A. (2019). The role of China's state-owned companies explained, Available at: < https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/>

Harrigan K. R. (1988). Joint Ventures and Competitive Strategy, Strategic Management Journal, 9, 41-158.

Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviours, institutions, and organizations across nations.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hofstede-Insights (2020). Country Comparison: China VS. China, Retrieved from: < https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/china,india/>

Hollenstein, H. (2005). Determinants of International Activities: Are SMEs Different?, Small Business Economics, 24, pp. 431-450.

Hutzschenreuter, T., Voll, J. C. and Verbeke, A. (2011) The Impact of Added Cultural Distance and Cultural Diversity on International Expansion Patterns: A Penrosean Perspective, Journal of Management Studies, 48(2)

Ismaili, U., Samel, M., Solomon, E., et al. (2016). Slovakia: Automotive Cluster, Retrieved from: < https://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-harvard/Documents/pdf/student-projects/Slovakia%20Automobiles%202016.pdf>

Jaguar and Land Rover (2015). JLR New Factory in Slovakia, Retrieved from: < https://www.jaguarlandrover.com/news/2015/12/jaguar-land-rover-confirms-new-factory-slovakia>

Jaguar and Land Rover (2016). Jaguar Land Rover Opens Factory in Brazil, Retrieved from: <https://media.jaguarlandrover.com/news/2016/06/jaguar-land-rover-opens-factory-brazil#:~:text=Brazil%20is%20one%20of%20Jaguar,the%20main%20territories%20of%20Brazil. >

Jancarikova, T. (2018). Jaguar Land Rover launches Slovak plant amid Brexit jobs fears, Retrieved from: < https://www.autonews.com/article/20181025/COPY01/310259922/jaguar-land-rover-launches-slovak-plant-amid-brexit-jobs-fears >.

Jian, Y. (2019). Jaguar Land Rover hurt by quality control issues in China, Retrieved from: <https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/jaguar-land-rover-hurt-quality-control-issues-china >.

Johanson J. & J.E. Vahlne, (1977). ‘The Internationalization Process of the Firm—A model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments’, Journal of International Business Studies 8 (1), 23–32

Johanson, J. & J.E. Vahlne, (1990). ‘The Mechanism of Internationalisation’, International Marketing Review, 7 (4), 11–25.

Johanson, J, & F. Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975, ‘The Internationalization of the Firm—Four Swedish Cases’, Journal of Management Studies 12 (3), 305–322.

Johanson, J. & J.E. Vahlne J-E, (2003). ‘Business relationship learning and commitment’, Journal of International Entrepreneurship 1, 83–101.

Joseph, N. (2014) ‘Jaguar Land Rover opens first overseas factory in China’, [online] Available at: < https://www.autoblog.com/2014/10/22/jaguar-land-rover-china-factory-opens/>. [Accessed on 30 May 2020]

Kaur, M. J., and Chawla, M. R. (2016). Impact of culture on marketing strategies. Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR), 2(3), 325-330.

Kubickova, L., Votoupalova, M. & Toulova, M. (2014). Key Motives for Internationalization Process of Small and Medium–Sized Enterprises, Procedia Economics and Finance, 12, 319-328.

Li, S. & Alon, I. (2020). China’s Intellectual Property Rights Provocation: A Political Economy View, Journal of International Business policy, 3, 60-72

Liou, T., & Wu, J. (2010) "Government-business relations in china’s economic development", International Journal of Organization Theory & Behaviour, 13(3), 354-377.

Luo, B., Wang, C. & Liang, L. (2017). Chery Automobile, Asian Case Research Journal, 21(01):37-80

Luo, D., Chen, K.C, & Wu, L. (2017) Political uncertainty and firm risk in China, Review of Development Finance 7(2). 102 – 131.

Luo, Y. (2007). "Are joint venture partners more opportunistic in a more volatile environment?". Strategic Management Journal. 28 (1): 39–60

Luu, N. H. (2016). Greenfield investments, cross-border M&As, and economic growth in emerging countries, Economics and Business Letters, 5(3), 87-94.

Mujtaba, A. & Martina, M. (2011). Multinational Enterprises’ Entry Mode Strategies and Uncertainty: A Review and Extension, International Journal of Management Reviews, 13, pp. 376–392

Oica. (2018). 2016 Statistics OICA. Available at: < http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2016-statistics/>

Rugman, A., and Hodgetts, R. (2001) ‘The end of global strategy’. European Management Journal, 19(4), 333-343.

Salam, M. T. (2013). Internationalization of Tata Motors: The Case of JLR. Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2396897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396897

Schotter, A. & Teagarden, M. B. (2014) ‘Protecting Intellectual Property in China’, MT Sloan Management Review, 55(4),

Statista (2020a) ‘Jaguar Land Rover: global pre-tax profit 2011-2019’, [online] Available at: < https://www.statista.com/statistics/387191/jaguar-land-rover-global-profit-before-tax/>. [Accessed on 29 May 2020]

Statista (2020b) ‘Jaguar Land Rover: global sales, by region 2013-2019’, Available at: .

Tata (2019). Annual Report 2018- 2019, Available at: < https://www.tcs.com/content/dam/tcs/investor-relations/financial-statements/2018-19/ar/annual-report-2018-2019.pdf >

Trading Economics (2019). Slovakia Steel Production, Retrieved from: < https://tradingeconomics.com/slovakia/steel-production >

Trading Economies (2020). China Total Vehicle Sales, Retrieved from: < https://tradingeconomics.com/china/total-vehicle-sales >

Twomey, M. J. (2000). A Century of Foreign Investment in the Third World (Book). Routledge.

Wright, I. (2020). Chinese Copycats: The Good and The Bad, Retrieved from: < https://carbuzz.com/features/chinese-copycats-the-good-and-the-bad >

Expansion of Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in China in the Perspective of International Management